Heald criminal justice program

You'd think that the government would crack down on this BS since many of the loans end up in default. Mine did when I couldn't afford to pay on it and they finally started taking it out of my paycheck forcing me to consolidate and often times defer. I owe more now than I borrowed, will likely owe them till I die. I was never received assistance for job placement. I stayed to get a degree in the Criminal Justice Program.

In Novemer I lost my job and had to take a break from school because I didn't have money to pay rent, gas,food, etc.

I went on campus to use their computers for job placement. Career Services was still not helping with job placement. On February 2, Tell me I was not allowed on campus,followed directly behind me, laughing remarking, "Don't act a criminal and I won't call security. Since I am Hispanic I must be doing somethign illegal. They never rectify the issue or apologized.

The issue has escalated and they still didnt help with job placement. There is also a Yolo County Probation Officer who makes sexual comments to female students, this is a very unhealthy environement. Proof of a chain of custody, i. As we said in State v. Thibodeau, Me. Here, the pistol, which the court allowed in evidence over the defendant's objection, bore the same serial number as the weapon seized from the defendant on February 16, and exhibited an "X" identical to that scratched upon it by the testifying witness, in addition to testimony that in its overall outward appearance, the exhibit was indistinguishable from the firearm found on the defendant.

The identifying markings on the pistol, independently of the chain of custody, were adequate indicia of the identity of the firearm involved to support the admissibility of the exhibit in evidence. Eldridge, Me. Mosher, Me. The defendant requested the trial Justice to instruct the jury that the elements of the crime charged are: the knowing and willing possession of a firearm by a previously convicted felon.

The Justice did indicate that the proscribed possession had to be a knowing possession, but refused to charge in terms of willingness in respect thereto. In this, there was no error. The requested instruction did not correctly state the law regarding the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. Possession statutes, such as 15 M.

The Legislature, in enacting the reference statute, contemplated a knowing or conscious possession as an essential element of the offense. Harris v. State, 83 Nev. State, A. Lofthouse, 18 Ill. Willingness, as well as wilfulness, to violate the law as intended by the requested instruction, is not an essential ingredient of the crime of possession of a firearm by a felon.

Harmon, 25 Ariz. Petrucci, F. That a felon's possession of a firearm is a knowing or conscious possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Ross v. State, supra. In this case, the circumstances were sufficient to justify the jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Heald knew he was in possession of the revolver, where the gun was tucked away in the pocket of the jacket he was wearing.

The record discloses no evidence whatsoever, not even a suggestion, that the revolver was in the defendant's jacket by accident or trickery.

Upon appropriate motions for judgment of acquittal the defendant has properly raised for review his contention that, since the deputy sheriff who seized the weapon testified he saw the butt of a gun in the pocket of Heald's jacket as the defendant wheeled away from him, it was error to find the defendant guilty of possession of a firearm by a felon under 15 M. In support of his contention, the defendant cites: People v. Crachy, Ill. State, 9 Md. Commonwealth, S.

These cases are not apposite, since in each one the statutory proscription had to do with the carrying of a "concealed" weapon. Our statute, on the other hand, makes it unlawful for a felon within a stated period of time to have in his possession any pistol, revolver or any other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.

In section , the Legislature further defined a weapon capable of being concealed upon the person as including all firearms having a barrel of less than 12 inches in length. The Legislature, under 15 M. The essential characteristic of the firearm which brings it within the scope of the statutory ban is its concealability.

We said as much in Toussaint v. The revolver was an exhibit in the case and the jury had it in the jury room during their deliberations. The jury could as the factfinder determine from the exhibit itself its capability of being concealed upon the person and could conclude from the mere view thereof that its possession satisfied the requirements of 15 M.

Smith, Me. The defendant first contends that his attempted appeal from the jury verdict of guilty of the current offense of possession of a firearm by a felon prior to the resumption of the second stage of the bifurcated trial to establish the defendant's previous felony conviction of manslaughter caused 15 M. In this, the defendant is in error. The dual indictment process required by this statute was enacted by the Legislature in an effort to protect the purity of the initial trial of the present criminal charge by excluding therefrom any evidence of a previous felony conviction, provided the defendant himself did not lay the basis for the introduction of such previous conviction for impeachment purposes by taking the stand at his trial.

Our second offender statute, 15 M. The punishment under it is for the present criminal offense only. What the act does, it provides a greater penalty for having committed the latest offense by reason of the fact the defendant is a subsequent offender.

McDonald v. Massachusetts, U. Rigg, Minn. Price, 59 Wash. Hening, Va. Washington, 47 N. Davis, Iowa , N. This agrees with our own view that the act merely enhances the punishment which may be meted out for the commission of the current offense.

Carr v. There is no appealable judgment until the sentence has been imposed on the current offense, either pursuant to the habitual offender statute if the previous conviction and sentence to a state prison have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt State v. As we said in Mottram v. See Stubbs v. The defendant further argues that 15 M. Heald contends that the previous conviction contemplated by this statute is a final conviction, and not a conviction subject to or under appeal at the time of the commission of the current offense.

In chronological order, the manslaughter offense occurred on January 16, and Heald was convicted of that crime on June 17, see State v. The defendant was charged with this subsequent offense by grand jury indictment found on May 2, The manslaughter conviction had been affirmed by the Law Court on July 6, Some authorities construe their habitual offender statutes as requiring the previous conviction to be a final judgment and hold that a previous conviction, pending an appeal therefrom, cannot be used as the basis of enhanced punishment pursuant to such statutes see 24 B C.

We disagree. As in the case of 15 M. We need not repeat what we said in connection with our analysis of 15 M. The paramount purpose of habitual offender statutes is to protect society against the repetitious criminal; such statutes are essentially designed to combat recidivism.

Legislatures view with alarm the constant increase in criminal activity to which the recidivist contributes in large measure and, in an attempt to reach their objective of cutting down on crime, our Legislators set out to enhance the punishment for criminal conduct by a person who had previously committed a serious crime, had been convicted thereof and sentenced to a state prison.

Such legislation, they believed, would serve as a deterrent to criminals who might otherwise be tempted to continue a life-style of crime and, in the case of those who disregarded the statutory warning, it provided increased punishment for criminal conduct which, under such circumstances, our Legislators deemed aggravated the guilt and justified the greater penalty.

The legislative purpose would be frustrated, if the statute applied only to previous convictions which later became final judgments. Indeed, the recidivist who appealed his previous conviction would escape the penal additive of the habitual offender statute, notwithstanding that his previous conviction was affirmed on appeal.

The Legislature undoubtedly had in mind that many appeals are frivolous, and, even in the case of non-frivolous appeals, that the percentage of reversals is minimal. At the time of Heald's original appeal from the previous conviction of manslaughter in the summer of and on October 31, when he obtained a reinstatement of the appeal in habeas corpus proceedings, said appeals did not vacate the judgment of conviction.

Review by the Law Court, whether by way of exceptions or by appeal from the denial of a motion for new trial, is a purely statutory proceeding and the scope, limits and conditions of such appellate procedure must either be found in express terms in the statutes authorizing the same or be implied from the nature and purpose of the legislation itself.

See In Re Smith, Me. Dodge, Me. Bey, Me. The statutory amendment P. This is consistent with what we said in State v. Fletcher, Me. Here, the former conviction had been affirmed before the instant indictment under 15 M. The effect of the appeal was as though it had not been taken. Eisminger, Kan. Morlock, Mich. Corbin v. Court of Appeals, Division I, Ariz.

Sarnblad, 26 Cal. The defendant lastly contends that the prosecutor's decision to seek a separate indictment from the grand jury in connection with the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon pursuant to the habitual offender statute, 15 M. Failure to present any such defense or objection by motion before trial constitutes a waiver thereof.

The question of discriminatory prosecution relates not to the guilt or innocence of the accused, but rather addresses itself to a constitutional defect in the institution of the prosecution. Berrigan, F. The rule itself, however, expressly empowers the court to grant relief from the waiver for cause shown. Such happened in the court below, since the trial Justice entertained the defense, but the issue was aired before the Court without the jury.

Preliminarily, the defendant claims that it was error not to submit the issue of impermissible discrimination to the jury. Jury disclosure of the defendant's claim that he was being singled out as a recidivist because of his advocacy in prison for prison reform and the enforcement of his fellow inmates' constitutional rights would tend to prejudice the jury against the defendant in connection with the issues directly involved in the habitual offender portion of the trial by showing him up as a trouble maker.

Such collateral matters as the prosecutor's motives underlying the prosecution or the defendant's past conduct as well as his personal beliefs respecting the surcharge of recidivism are subjects best reserved for determination by the court alone. See United States v. Berrigan, supra. The defense of discriminatory prosecution consists of two basic elements: 1 other individuals similarly situated have not been prosecuted for comparable criminal conduct, and 2 the selective enforcement was deliberately made on an impermissible and unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, a desire to discourage the exercise of one's constitutional rights or other invidious criteria.

Oyler v. Boles, U. Swanson, F. Berrios, F. Murch, F. The gist of the evidence which the defendant claims supports his contention of unconstitutional discrimination in the use by the State of the charge of habitual offender against him consists of the following factual situation.

During the years and Heald had assisted other inmates and took an active part in the filing of numerous complaints in the United States District Court of Maine challenging prison conditions and practices raising due process issues involving, in some instances, inadequacy of food to lack of proper medical attention, and, in others, mail censorship and forbidden access to the news media. The prison authorities manifested their animosity toward him, so Heald testified, by lodging him in the "strip cell" naked for six months and keeping him on bread and water for 75 days.

He spoke of beatings and told of his illegal transfer to a federal prison. The Classification Officer at the prison did admit that, out of an inmate population of some four hundred persons, he knew of only one instance where a violation of the habitual offender statute had been charged, although recidivists at the prison numbered about seventy individuals.

The Justice below ruled that the evidence fell far short of supporting prosecutorial discrimination to the extent of a constitutional violation. We agree. It is well established that a reasonable prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of criminal laws is inherent in our criminal justice system and that the exercise of such discretion does not amount to unconstitutional discrimination unless it is deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.

Swanson, supra. Many reasons may exist for the failure to prosecute persons subject to increased punishment as habitual offenders. It may be that the prior conviction may not be susceptible of proof, because of the inability to secure the knowledgeable witness. It may be that the particular prosecutor did not know of the previous conviction at the time of the grand jury proceedings.

It may be that the prosecutor felt the statute relating to the current crime provided a range of penalty sufficient to vindicate the dignity of the State in the individual case without any need of the additional recidivist charge.